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Economic crisis and recovery:  
Changes in second birth rates within  




This study assesses the decline in second birth rates for men and women across 
different skill levels in transitional Russia. Changes within educational groups and 
occupational classes are observed over three distinct time periods: the Soviet era, 
economic crisis, and economic recovery. The most remarkable finding is the similarity 
in the extent second birth rates declined within educational groups and occupational 
classes during the economic crisis. Although further decline occurred in the recovery 
period, more variation emerged across groups.  
 
 
1 PhD, Demography Unit, Dept. of Sociology, Stockholm University.  
E-mail: sunnee.billingsley@sociology.su.se. Department of Political and Social Sciences, Pompeu Fabra 
Universitat, Barcelona, Spain. Billingsley: Changes in second birth rates within occupational classes and educational groups 
   http://www.demographic-research.org  376
                                                          
1. Introduction  
The fall of the Soviet Union initiated an era of unparalleled political and economic 
reform according to the breadth, depth, and speed of changes. The shift towards 
democracy and capitalism entailed greater personal freedom for thought, expression, 
and lifestyles. The dismantling of the command economy allowed competition to 
flourish, thus improving productivity. Overall individual well-being should have been 
enhanced through increased freedom and economic resources. However in Russia and 
many other countries that underwent market reform, the transition was accompanied by 
economic crisis, which decreased well-being through insecurity and material hardship. 
Populations that had never dealt with extreme social risk suddenly found themselves 
unemployed, unpaid or having to cope with hyperinflation, while lacking a sufficient 
safety net and watching the “winners” of the transition achieve unprecedented wealth.
2  
Undoubtedly these complicated transformations influenced demographic trends, 
including whether and when individuals decided to have children. Indeed while the 
majority of men and women had two children in Russia before 1990, the total fertility 
rate (TFR) fell to below 1.2 by the end of the 1990s (Zhakarov and Ivanova 1996).
3 
Research has shown very little relevance of postponement to the majority of this 
fertility decline, nor does it appear due to increasing childlessness; the decline seems to 
be due to stopping behavior in which second and higher order births declined (Sobotka 
2002). 
A widespread debate continues on whether fertility is related positively or 
negatively to economic conditions (see Örsal and Goldstein 2010 and Sobotka, 
Skirbekk, and Philipov 2010 for recent reviews). At the macro level, a pro-cyclical 
relationship across many countries has emerged in recent decades. In Russia this trend 
also appears to exist. Figure 1 shows the decline and moderate recovery of the total 
fertility rate, as well as demonstrates how it closely tracks GDP development.  
As Russia moved toward democracy and capitalism, the mainstream economic 
(Becker 1960, 1981; Hotz, Klerman, and Willis 1997) and ideational (Lesthaeghe and 
van de Kaa 1986) theories of fertility became increasingly relevant. Wage dispersion 
increased the returns to education and the difference between earnings by occupational 
class, which should have generated higher opportunity costs of childrearing for women 
with increasingly high income potential. New political and social freedoms, along with 
some later expansion of higher education, should have promoted more individualized 
decision-making in regards to major life course events. However little theory exists in 
 
2 The increase in inequality during this time period across some former Soviet Union republics was the largest 
and most accelerated ever recorded (Milanovic 1998). 
3 Avdeev and Monnier (1995) point out that although the majority of women in much earlier cohorts had at 
least two children, it was not necessarily universal to have more than one. Demographic Research: Volume 24, Article 16 
mainstream fertility research to guide an investigation of whether and how women alter 
their fertility behavior during an economic crisis, as most economic theories of fertility 
are premised on contexts of continued economic growth and women’s labor force 
expansion.  
 






























































































Note: TFR is measured on the left axis and GDP per capita is measured on the right axis in constant 2000 USD.  
Source: TransMonee Database, Innocenti Research Centre, UNICEF 
 
 
Sobotka, Skirbekk, and Philipov (2010) review research spanning the major 
economic recessions of the 20
th century and list multiple mechanisms through which 
recession influences fertility behavior; these include job instability and unemployment, 
income effects related to unemployment, uncertainty and anomie, lower housing 
availability, prolongation of time spent in education, as well as differential effects of 
opportunity costs. Economic uncertainty in particular has received significant attention 
as an explanation that may explain low fertility levels (e.g., Blossfeld et al. 2005 and 
Kohler, Billari, and Ortega 2002).
4 Kreyenfeld (2009) analyzed economic uncertainty 
in a transitional society by comparing East and West Germans’ first birth transition 
rates. She found some evidence that East German women were reluctant to start a 
family when worried about their job stability, but not that unemployment itself deterred 
them from having their first child. 
                                                           
4 Economic uncertainty has also been used as an explanation for why people continue to have a child when 
there is labor market uncertainty (Friedman, Hechter, and Kanazawa 1994). 
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In research on low fertility in Russia, Bühler (2004) found a positive relationship 
between extra sources of income or sustenance and second births. Perelli-Harris (2006) 
found a positive relationship between informal work, subjective well-being and 
second/higher order births. However in an attempt to address the straightforward impact 
of crisis on fertility behaviour in 1993, Kharkova and Andreev (2000) did not find 
evidence of a relationship. In their micro data analysis, Kohler and Kohler (2002) in 
fact found a positive relationship between labor market uncertainty/hardship and births 
between 1994 and 1996. On the other hand, macro level studies found evidence of a 
positive relationship between fertility and the economy across Russia and post 
communist Europe (Kohler and Kohler 2002; UNECE 2000; Cornia and Paniccia 1998; 
Billingsley 2010). Beyond the need for further research to understand these differential 
findings, Frejka (2008) has argued that the pathways through which fertility behavior 
was influenced during the critical transition period remain ambiguous and 
underspecified in much of the literature. 
For example rarely discussed in this literature are other crisis/recession 
mechanisms that characterized the Russian economic crisis. Inflation, wage arrears, and 
wage devaluation all contributed to suppressing resources during the 1990s. Purchasing 
power is essential to the affordability of raising a child and decreasing purchasing 
power increases the cost of childbearing. If income is considered too low, the direct 
costs of childbearing may be considered too high (Becker 1960); this is how we 
understand the general conclusion that relatively high income is one of the prerequisites 
for childbearing in Europe (Hobcraft and Kiernan 1995). Little research has taken into 
account how purchasing power may be related to childbearing, particularly during 
economic recession or crisis. Becker (1960) found a positive relationship between birth 
rates and consumption of durables in the US. This positive relationship has been 
demonstrated in the Netherlands as well (Fokkema et al. 2008). While this relationship 
has not been assessed in the Russian context of the 1990s, we do know that the cost of 
goods rose dramatically and the value of wages fell (Barr 2001; Blanchard 1997), which 
implies that the direct costs of raising a child increased.  
It is common practice in demographic research to consider education as a proxy 
for income potential when assessing the importance of opportunity costs to fertility 
behavior; we generally expect highly educated women to postpone or forego 
childbearing due to the high opportunity costs incurred with stepping out of the labor 
market to have a/another child. Women with lower income potential incur less of a loss 
in income if they become inactive. This study follows this standard and also assesses 
another indicator of potential income, occupational class. Both of these pieces of 
information can be used to assess long-term and immediate income potential.
5 In this 
 
5 Differential contraceptive use by educational groups in Russia (Perlman and McKee 2009) may also 
generate differential fertility behavior across educational groups. While we cannot separate unplanned from Demographic Research: Volume 24, Article 16 
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study I observe second birth rates according to these two measures of human capital for 
both men and women and juxtapose these rates across multiple time periods in which 
the economic context significantly varied to observe whether men and women with 
similar educational levels and occupational classes behaved differently depending on 
the economic context. While this strategy may provide new information and insight into 
determinants of lower second birth rates, it tells us nothing about the contribution to 
fertility behavior in Russia of changes in the culture surrounding childbearing or other 
long term processes. In other words, although the economic context is the focus of this 
study, it is not considered the sole driver of the fertility decline, as other social and 
cultural transformations undoubtedly played a role as well.  
In the next sections, I discuss specific changes in the economic context from 1991 
to 2004 and how they may have been experienced by individuals with different 
educational levels and occupational classes. I also explain how the analytical approach 
of this study deviates from past approaches. In the following sections I detail the data 
used in the analysis, methods and results. The final section discusses the findings and 
proposes interpretations of the results.  
 
 
2. The economic context in Russia, 1991-1999 and 2000-2004  
The first years of transition in Russia brought about massive and rapid economic 
changes, the effects of which are visible across many indicators. The proportion of 
households living below the poverty line grew from 11% in 1992 to 36% in 1996, while 
the ratio of income in the top 20% to the bottom 20% increased 68% (Zohoori et al. 
1998). Labor force survey data on unemployment (Laborsta) show a steady increase 
from 1992-1999, in which the unemployment rate more than doubled (5.2-12.6%). 
Men’s unemployment rates were slightly higher than women’s throughout this increase, 
but both have declined similarly from 2000-2007. Milanovic (1998) reported that 
unemployment benefits were poorly targeted in Russia. From 1989 to 1998, Katz 
(2001) calculated that labor force participation rates in Russia declined from 
approximately 85% to 68% for women aged 20-29, 95% to 85% for women aged 30-49, 
and 82% to 75% for women aged 50-54. ILO data (Laborsta) also show a marked drop 
in the rate of the economically active. In 1989, 77% of all men 15 years or older were 
economically active, whereas 61% of women were. A decade later, a 10% decline was 
 
planned pregnancies in this analysis, widespread use of abortion in Russia may somewhat mitigate an effect 
of differential contraceptive use by education on the pregnancies that do come to term. However, there is 
evidence of a decline in abortions over the 1990s and an increase in modern contraception use (Troitskaya 
and Andersson 2007). Alternatively, occupational class may signal social status or prestige that may also be 
relevant to fertility decisions (e.g., Skirbekk 2008). Billingsley: Changes in second birth rates within occupational classes and educational groups 
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evident for both men and women. Enrolment in higher education stagnated and even 
declined slightly during the early years of transition in Russia; it was not until 1995, the 
first year of some economic recovery, that enrolment rates increased. Gerber (2000) 
explains this early decline, which was driven by lower enrolment of men, as a response 
to economic crisis and the opportunity costs of remaining in school when inflation and 
economic instability increased the need for earnings. Changes in the labor force have 
occurred as well.  
As firms privatized and new private firms developed, returns to skill increased. 
Wage dispersion brought with it widening educational and occupational differentials 
that imply heterogeneous experiences of the economic transition and crisis. Indeed 
research on wage development in transitional Russia highlight different trajectories for 
different skill levels. Analyzing the first years of transition, 1991-1994, Brainerd (1998) 
found that significantly fewer individuals in the lower end of the wage distribution 
received wage increases in 1993 than those in the upper end (63% vs. 86%, 
respectively). In regards to specific differences between educational groups, university 
educated women received a wage premium of 38% in 1991, compared to secondary 
educated women, and this grew to 65% by 1994. The difference between the wages of 
women with secondary education and those with incomplete secondary education was 
negligible in 1991, but had increased by 1994 to the extent that women with incomplete 
secondary education received 15% lower wages. For men the gains were a little lower 
for those with university education, but by 1994 men who did not complete secondary 
school earned 20% less than men who did. This pattern persisted when Brainerd 
controlled for work and demographic characteristics. Wage premiums by occupational 
class revealed similar findings; relative to the average wage, the premium for top 
managers increased from 28% in 1991 to 81% by 1994. Unskilled workers’ wages fell 
from 25% below the average wage in 1991 to 44% in 1994. Lukyanova (2006) analyzed 
wage inequality in Russia from 1994 to 2003 and confirmed that university educated 
individuals gained more in terms of real wages in this time period as well.  
The rise in income inequality was exacerbated by wage arrears (i.e., unpaid or 
delayed wages) and Lehmann and Wadsworth (2001) estimate that wage dispersion 
would have been 20-30% less without wage arrears. Wage arrears also had a substantial 
impact on household finances; Gerber (2006) estimated the net effect of one earner in a 
household experiencing complete nonpayment of wages to be a 24% decline in per 
capita household income. Wage arrears appear to have increased throughout the late 
1990s but this trend reversed in 2000 when arrears fell to much lower levels. The 
Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) has been used extensively to assess 
arrears and the time trend is visible in Figure 2. This figure also displays differences in 
arrears according to a basic division of occupational classes, including manual workers, 
low-mid grade workers, intermediate employees and managers, and the professional Demographic Research: Volume 24, Article 16 
class.
6 Almost uniformly more manual workers did not receive their full wages on time 
than in any other class. But working in higher occupational classes did not necessarily 
protect individuals from arrears.  
 
Figure 2:  Percent of men and women within each occupational class that 
experienced wage arrears  
  
Source: RLMS data 
 
 
In the midst of this turbulent economic context, inflation—and hyperinflation in 
the first years—occurred. Changes in the consumer price index reveal that Russia’s 
annual price index increased over 1000% in the early 1990s (TransMonee database, 
Innocenti Research Centre, UNICEF). Many aspects of the economic climate in the 
1990s, therefore, suggest downward pressure on resources, which indicate an increase 
in the relative cost of having a child. From the onset of transition until 1999 is a time 
http://www.demographic-research.org   381
                                                           
6 This class schema is based on the European Socioeconomic Class (SeC) schema created at the Institute for 
Social and Economic Research.  Billingsley: Changes in second birth rates within occupational classes and educational groups 
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period that is generally considered an unfavorable economic climate. We may expect 
the less skilled to have restricted or postponed childbearing particularly during this 
time. However keeping a position in the labor market was less rewarding during this 
time, which may have had the opposite effect of encouraging childbearing for those 
with lower returns to employment, at least for women.  
Most of the discussion thus far has been focused on the turbulent 1990s. A reversal 
in the trends of both arrears and unemployment rates occurred in 2000. GDP per capita 
continued to increase at this point as well and the direction of trends in wage inequality 
reversed. Hence the time period from 2000 to 2004 is considered one of economic 
growth and recovery. This economic revival may have brought about even lower 
childbearing across all groups since employment became more available as well as 
more regularly paid and this should have dramatically increased the opportunity costs of 
stepping out of the labor market, particularly for the highest skilled. Conversely 
incomes should have increased at least to the degree that less people experienced wage 
arrears, rendering the costs of childbearing more feasible.  
Although there is some room for hypothesizing about how human capital 
moderated the effects of economic crisis and recovery on fertility behavior for men and 
women, this study takes an exploratory approach. At the minimum we can expect direct 
cost effects to be more evident for men to the extent that men are still considered the 
main breadwinners within the household. Opportunity cost effects should be stronger 
for women than men since women provide the larger share of child care as well as more 
often step out of the labor force for childrearing. Higher non participation for women 
after having a first child also means that studying the effect of occupational class on 
second birth transitions implies different selectivity issues for men and women. Women 
who stay in the labor market and have an occupational class may be different in their 
childbearing behavior from women who are inactive after the first child; men, on the 
other hand, are unlikely to withdraw from the labor market after becoming a parent. The 
strategy to deal with this issue is explained in the results section, and different 
specifications of the occupational class model are not expected to alter the results for 
men.  
In sum two layers of comparison structure this analysis. First second birth rates by 
educational level and occupational class are observed. The second source of comparison 
is time. Three distinct time periods have emerged in the discussion that are analyzed: 
the Soviet era, which lasted until the end of 1991; poor economic conditions, from the 
end of 1991 to 1999; and economic recovery, from 2000 to 2004. Rather than compare 
transition rates directly across occupational classes or educational categories, which 
would reveal nothing about the decline in second births over time, I compare the 
differences in transition rates over time within these groups. The results will tell us 
which educational groups or occupational classes had the greatest change in transition Demographic Research: Volume 24, Article 16 
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rates across time periods. While past approaches that strictly compare rates across 
groups—such as in Kharkova and Andreev (2000) and Kohler and Kohler (2002)—may 
reflect data capacity at the time, in which information was available for only a limited 
time period, and may capture valid differences in the fertility behaviour among women 
of different educational levels or socioeconomic status, they do not offer information 
about the decline in fertility. Recent data collected in Russia allow us to go beyond the 
strategies in these early studies to better assess for whom fertility behaviour changed 
the most dramatically. Some degree of a human capital/fertility gradient is expected, but 
more important is to know which groups of individuals are having fewer children than 
they used to have. 
 
 
3. Data and methods  
The data used in this analysis are from the Russian Generations and Gender Survey 
(GGS)
7 and the supplementary Education and Employment Survey (EES)
8. The GGS 
data are of a nationally representative sample of 18-79 year olds that was conducted in 
2004. The EES data are of a GGS subsample of 18-55 year olds in 2005. A 
retrospective survey was given to this subsample, which collected detailed life histories 
of all education and employment activity since January of the year the respondent 
turned 17. Through these two sources, we have rich and complete knowledge of the 
main events occurring in the respondents’ lives as they pertain to childbearing, work 
and education. All time-varying covariates are recorded on a monthly basis; therefore, 
the person-month is the unit of analysis. One limitation of the EES is that we have no 
information on partners’ education and employment activity over the life course, which 
limits the analysis to individual-level factors and prohibits an analysis of household 
characteristics. 
To analyze second birth rates, I use event history modeling, which is a particularly 
useful model when analyzing time dependent processes and allows the characteristics of 
the respondent to change over time. To allow for variation in the baseline hazard rate 
over time since the first birth, I use a piecewise constant model. The dependent variable 
is the rate of having a second child and the moment of observation begins when the 
 
7 The Russian GGS was conducted by the Independent Institute of Social Policy (Moscow) with the financial 
support of the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation and the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, Germany. The 
design and standard survey instruments of the GGS were adjusted to the Russian context by the Independent 
Institute of Social Policy (Moscow) and the Demoscope Independent Research Center (Moscow) in 
collaboration with the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research (Rostock, Germany). 
8 The Education and Employment Survey for Russia was conducted by the Max Planck Institute for 
demographic Research (Rostock), the Independent Institute of Social Policy (Moscow), and the Demoscope 
Independent Research Center (Moscow) (Bühler et al. 2007). Billingsley: Changes in second birth rates within occupational classes and educational groups 
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respondent has a first child. Almost 5000 respondents in this sample had a first child 
and were therefore at risk of having a second child.
9 Over 2500 of these individuals 
went on to have a second child before participating in the survey. In order to carefully 
analyze second birth determinants, all second birth events are predated 8 months before 
the actual birth of the child. This accounts for a gestation period as well as shifts the 
event under analysis to the time around which a decision about the pregnancy would 
have been made. Individuals who do not carry the pregnancy to term are not counted as 
having conceived a second child. Respondents who did not have a second child were 
censored 8 months before the interview to allow for the possibility that they had a 
second child shortly following the interview. Since the focus of this study is on the 
decision to have a second child only, individuals who had twins instead of a single first 
child were excluded from the sample. Most of the second births in this sample occurred 
before market reforms began, but there were 257 second births for men and 398 for 
women from 1991-1999 and 130 births for men and 200 for women from 2000-2004. 
When there was missing information about the respondent, the respective indicator 
takes a value indicating missing information, rather than excluding the observation.  
Educational level is constructed in this study as either low, medium or high. Low 
includes those who did not complete secondary education, even if they took some 
vocational courses. Medium educational attainment includes respondents who 
completed secondary education and may have also received technical training. Those 
who have a high educational attainment received an undergraduate or graduate degree 
from an institute, university, or academy. The survey provides the month and year in 
which the respondent moved from one educational level to another as well as when they 
reached their highest educational attainment and these changes are reflected across the 
person-months. When respondents report education or training as the main activity of a 
time period, they take the status of being in education. 
When respondents report paid employment as their main activity, they are 
considered in the labor force and are assigned an occupational class according to the 
characteristics of their job. This information also varies by the month. We also know 
the main activity if the respondent was not employed, including military service, home-
making, in education, unemployed, on leave, or on a pension. Of the women who were 
not participating in the labor force, 80% were on maternity or parental leave.
10 Since 
unpaid leave was extended until the child reaches age three during the 1990s, women 
are expected to have been on leave and not participating for at least some of the time 
 
9 Since EES data only record histories from January of the year in which the respondent turns 17, all 
information recorded in the months before the respondent turns 17 are censored. Removing those respondents 
who had their first child before other information was recorded excludes 118 men and women, 81 of which 
conceived in the 16
th year. 17 more respondents were excluded because they did not know the year of their 
first birth.  
10 The remaining women that are inactive are those with disabilities or studying.  Demographic Research: Volume 24, Article 16 
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period under observation. The link between leave-taking, labor force participation, and 
fertility is a complex aspect of second birth determinants and is addressed more directly 
in Billingsley and Sinyavskaya (2010).  
Following other research on occupational class in Russia (Gerber and Hout 2004) 
and the Soviet Union (Marshall et al. 1995), I use a categorization based on the 
Erikson-Goldthorpe-Portocarero (EGP) schema and one that is similar to the European 
Socioeconomic Classification (SeC) used to construct occupational class in the RLMS 
data (see Figure 2). The bottom class (similar to SeC1) is comprised of manual and 
routine workers, including agricultural or unqualified workers; the next class (similar to 
SeC2) is comprised of low to mid-grade workers, including qualified workers and 
employees who perform relatively simple tasks; the next class (similar to SeC3) is 
comprised of intermediate level employees, including foremen, team leaders and highly 
qualified workers; the highest class (similar to SeC4) is comprised of the Salariat, or 
professionals. See Appendix A for a fuller description of the class schema, as well as a 
clear and expected distribution of educational attainment across the classes in Appendix 
B. As mentioned, respondents that are not gainfully employed are categorized as either 
being unemployed or not participating in the labor force; therefore, every model that 
takes into account occupational class also allows the respondent to be unemployed or 
not participating in the labor force at that moment. In order to not over-control for 
measured and unmeasured skills, education and occupational class are not included in 
the same models; but whether or not the respondent is participating in the labor force is 
included in all models.  
A dummy variable is included in the model to reflect whether the survey took 
place in St. Petersburg or Moscow because the response rate was so low in these cities 
(about 15%) that selection into the survey may introduce bias.
11 To account for some of 
the intergenerational transmission of family culture that may generate a predisposition 
toward certain family sizes, the number of siblings the respondent has is included. 
Urban and rural differences in fertility behavior are common across many contexts, and 
are therefore important to include. In hopes of capturing some of the urban/rural 
influences on fertility behavior, the model controls for whether the respondent was born 
in an urban or rural location. Another factor that should be highly influential to fertility 
decisions is whether the respondent is in a serious relationship; this is measured by 
whether she/he is in a co-residential union (cohabiting or married), which can vary over 
the person-months. Finally, time since the first birth occurred and age at the time of the 
first birth are included; the latter aims to account for some of the remaining 
heterogeneity among the respondents, where postponement of entering parenthood is 
 
11 For sensitivity analyses, I also excluded respondents interviewed in these two cities and the results did not 
change.  Billingsley: Changes in second birth rates within occupational classes and educational groups 
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expected to be negatively related to further childbearing.
12 Summary statistics of 
exposures and occurrences for men and women are presented in Appendix C. 
 
 
4. Results  
First I display Kaplan-Meier failure estimates for transition to second births for both 
men and women in Figure 3. Three separate failure curves describe transitions in 
different time periods. Time period is a time-varying covariate and any respondent that 
had a first child contributes to each time period accordingly.
13 For example, a 
respondent who had a first child in January of 1994 and did not have a second child 
before being interviewed contributes to the failure estimate of the 1991-1999 time 
period for the first 72 months (along the x-axis), then contributes to the 2000-2004 
estimate from 73 to around 121 months (give or take some months for various interview 
schedules). The figure demonstrates an obvious decline in second birth events after the 
end of the Soviet Union. In comparison to the 75% of women and men who had a 
second child before 1991, around 50% had a second child in transitional Russia. 
Moreover a difference appears between the two time periods; in the early years 
following a first birth, the share transitioning to a second child was higher in the period 
of economic crisis (1991-1999) than in the economic recovery period (2000-2004). 
However the overall share that transitioned to second birth by the end of the observation 
period was higher for men and women from 2000 to 2004 than from 1991 to 1999. A 
main difference between these two periods is related to the spacing of births. Women 
and men had their second child sooner in the 1991-1999 time period than in the 2000-
2004 period; postponement of childbearing characterizes the economic recovery period 
and overall lower transition rates characterize the economic crisis period. At five years 
after the first birth, seven percent more women in the 1991-1999 period have had a 
second child. The difference completely disappears by the time ten years have passed 
since the first child was born and more births in later years give a three percentage point 
lead to women in the 2000-2004 period. The same pattern emerges for men.  
 
 
12 This general expectation is not likely to be as pronounced where age at childbearing is as young as it is in 
the Russian context, however. 
13 Failure estimates based on time-varying covariates are technically not very meaningful. However, this 
strategy, creating synthetic cohorts, allows each respondent to contribute to each time periods’ intensity as 
he/she progressed through these years—rather than allowing only those who, for example, had their first child 
in 1991 or later—and is appropriate when the point is to show an overall shift across time periods and avoids 
introducing selectivity based on postponement of the first birth into the estimates. Demographic Research: Volume 24, Article 16 
Figure 3:  Second birth estimates for men and women in Russia across three 
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The next results are of those of a basic model that includes the covariates and 
controls discussed above as well as dummy variables to capture the impact of time 
periods, net of observable personal characteristics. Table 1 presents model results when 
educational level is included in the model and the second table shows results from a 
model in which occupational class was included instead of educational level. Table 2 
presents only the estimates for the impact of occupational class and time period because 
these are the main variables of interest and the remaining estimates were almost 
identical in the two models. The relative risks for most of the control variables 
demonstrate expected relationships for both men and women: second birth rates were 
higher the more siblings the respondent has; respondents born in urban environments 
had a lower transition rate than those born in rural environments; second birth rates 
decreased as the age at first birth increased, particularly for women; respondents in co-
residential unions had higher second birth rates than those who were not; and the 
transition rate increased within the first five years after the first child was born and 
decreased after this point.  
One indicator had differential effects for men and women: men who were not 
participating in the labor market had a lower transition rate than men who were, 
whereas women who were not participating had a higher transition rate than those in the 
labor market. This difference is expected because men who drop out of the labor force 
in Russia are likely do so for health or disability reasons, whereas women are likely not 
participating because they are on leave or have chosen to stay home rather than return 
to work.  
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Table 1:  Hazard model of second birth rates for men and women in Russia, 
1967-2004  
  MEN WOMEN 
  Relative risk  S.E.  Relative risk  S.E. 
St. Petersburg/Moscow residence  0.85  (0.14)  0.76*  (0.09) 
        
Only child  0.94  (0.10)  0.87  (0.07) 
One sibling  1    1   
Two siblings   1.46***  (0.13)  1.24**  (0.08) 
Three or more siblings  1.72***  (0.15)  1.28***  (0.08) 
Missing 1.09  (0.23)  0.78  (0.16) 
        
Rural residence  1    1   
Urban residence  0.80**  (0.06)  0.83***  (0.04) 
Missing 1.13  (0.24)  0.76  (0.12) 
17-20 at first birth  1    1   
21-24 at first birth  0.95  (0.14)  0.88*  (0.05) 
25-29 at first birth  0.94  (0.14)  0.90  (0.07) 
30+ at first birth  0.89  (0.15)  0.46***  (0.06) 
        
Single 1    1   
Married or cohabiting  2.50***  (0.36)  3.55***  (0.30) 
        
In education  2.92**  (1.08)  0.48**  (0.12) 
Low educational level  1.17  (0.10)  1.14*  -0.07 
Medium educational level  1    1   
High educational level  1.06  (0.09)  1.02  (0.07) Demographic Research: Volume 24, Article 16 
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Table 1:  (Continued) 
  MEN WOMEN 
  Relative risk  S.E.  Relative risk  S.E. 
Participating in the labor market  1    1   
Not participating   0.47**  (0.11)  1.60***  (0.10) 
Missing 1.10  (0.43)  0.87  (0.36) 
        
1967-1991 1    1   
1991-1999 0.55***  (0.04)  0.39***  (0.02) 
2000-2004 0.49***  (0.05)  0.33***  (0.03) 
        
0-1 year since first child born  1    1   
1-2 years since first child born  7.36***  (1.65)  6.67***  (0.95) 
2-3 years since first child born  8.68***  (1.95)  8.49***  (1.25) 
3-4 years since first child born  9.61***  (2.17)  9.89***  (1.49) 
4-5 years since first child born  9.28***  (2.14)  10.43***  (1.61) 
5 + years since first child born  4.89***  (1.07)  6.45***  (0.94) 
 MEN  WOMEN 
# of subjects  1626  3198 
# of failures  907  1824 
time at risk  158828  329685 
Log Likelihood  -1845.90  -3596.53 
Prob > chi2  0.0000  0.0000 
 
Note: Statistical significance: * =5%, ** =1%, *** =0.1% 
 
 
Turning to the two variables of most interest in this table, education did not have a 
consistent impact for men and women, but time period did; both men and women had a 
significantly lower transition rate from 1991 to 1999 and an even lower rate from 2000 
to 2004. This is what we observed in the Kaplan Meier estimates. Men had a higher risk 
of second birth if they were still studying whereas women had a lower risk.  Besides 
this finding, which is driven by men attending university, there were no statistically 
significant differences between any of the educational levels for men. On the other Billingsley: Changes in second birth rates within occupational classes and educational groups 
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hand, women with incomplete secondary education had an elevated second birth 
transition rate relative to women who completed secondary education. Having received 
university education did not show a statistically different effect of completing 
secondary, and possibly specialized secondary, education. 
Table 2 presents only the estimates for occupational class and time period, as 
mentioned, from the full model results. First controlling for occupational class, rather 
than education, does not appear to alter the effect of the time periods. The relative risks 
for the two time periods are exactly the same in these models for women and within a 
few percentage points of each other for men (relative to time period in Table 1). Similar 
to the effect of education, the lowest-skilled women and men—those employed as 
manual workers—had higher transition rates than those with mid-level skills—in this 
case, the low-mid grade workers; manual working men have a 43% higher risk than 
low-mid grade workers and manual working women have a 24% higher second birth 
risk. Some evidence of a U-shaped relationship appears to exist for men, albeit the 
higher risk for professional men is not quite statistically significant. Again, inactive 
women have a higher transition rate than those in paid employment, in this case strictly 
relative to low-mid grade workers, and inactive men have a lower rate. 
 
Table 2:  Truncated results for hazard models of second birth rates for men 
and women in Russia, 1967-2004 
 MEN  WOMEN 
  Relative risk  S.E.  Relative risk  S.E. 
Unemployed 1.12  (0.29)  1.40  (0.28) 
Manual 1.43***  (0.14)  1.24*  (0.11) 
Low-mid 1    1   
Intermediate 0.94  (0.09)  1.01  (0.07) 
Professional 1.15  (0.11)  1.05  (0.09) 
Not participating   0.66*  (0.12)  1.60***  (0.12) 
Missing 1.28  (0.49)  0.90  (0.37) 
        
1967-1991 1    1   
1991-1999 0.54***  (0.04)  0.39***  (0.02) 
2000-2004 0.47***  (0.05)  0.33***  (0.03) 
 
Note:  Models control for the same variables as in Table 1, with the exception of education.  
Statistical significance: * =5%, ** =1%, *** =0.1% Demographic Research: Volume 24, Article 16 
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As outlined earlier, this paper is focused on how second birth decisions have 
varied over time for women and men with similar characteristics. This question relates 
directly to understanding the decline in fertility over the last two decades,
14 which the 
previous analyses do not address. The next results therefore present estimates of an 
interaction between the time periods and educational level, followed by estimates of an 
interaction between the time periods and occupational class.
15 I present the relative 
risks for each educational level or occupational class in two post socialist time periods, 
relative to those of the 1967-1991 time period. For example, in Figure 4, low educated 
men had a transition rate of 0.56 in the 1991-1999 period and 0.59 in the 2000-2004 
period, relative to the rate of low educated men in the 1967-1991 period. Although 
middle educated men experienced the lowest transition rate in the 1991-1999 period, 
relative to their rate in the Soviet era the variation, the fertility decline among all three 
educational levels in the crisis period was remarkably similar. In the 2000-2004 period, 
the highest educated men had the greatest reduction in second birth rates (0.43 vs. 0.48 
for the middle and 0.59 for the lowest educated). 
The estimates presented for women in the lower panel of Figure 4 reveal similar 
reductions in second birth transitions across educational groups. In the 1991-1999 
period, the reduction was slightly greater (i.e., lower relative risks) for the lowest and 
highest educated women: both had a 63% lower risk than their predecessors. In the 
2000-2004 period, women with the lowest educational level had the lowest transition 
rate, relative to women of the same educational level before the transition began; their 
relative risk is 0.23 in contrast to 0.33 for the highest educated women (relative to the 
risk of the highest educated women in 1967-1991) and 0.36 for women with middle 
educational attainment (relative to the risk of women with middle educational 
attainment in 1967-1991).  
Figure 5 displays results of models in which occupational class was interacted with 
time periods. Measuring skill level and income potential with occupational class has 
both benefits and shortcomings. Occupational class can be considered more informative 
than educational level because it tells us how the respondent fared in the job market  
 
 
14 Since this study focused on differences in second birth transition rates in the two time periods following 
1991, separating the 1980s in which there were pronatalist policies from the 1970s adds a layer of complexity 
that is not key to the analysis. However, it should be noted that the decline would likely have been from a 
lower starting point had pronatalist policies not been in place in the 1980s and the relative risks may not be 
quite as low in the following time periods. Since the interesting comparison in this paper is how the declines 
within classes over the two time periods after the Soviet era vary by skill level or human capital 
accumulation, the average rate over the 1970s and 1980s is a suitable reference category. 
15 Although all the interaction results presented in the figures are highly statistically significant, only some 
alternative interaction comparisons were. Specifically, the effect of being in some educational groups varies 
over the two later time periods for women and the effects of some occupational classes for men were 
significantly different within time periods.   Billingsley: Changes in second birth rates within occupational classes and educational groups 
Figure 4:  Second birth risks by educational attainment, 1991-1999 and  









































Note:  Risks are relative to men and women in the same educational groups from 1967 to November of 1991. Models control for 
time since first birth, age at first birth, whether respondent was surveyed in St. Pet. or Moscow, missing categories, siblings, 
urban/rural birth, union status and labor force status. All relative risks are statistically significant at the 0.1% level.  
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Figure 5:  Men: Second birth risks by occupational class, 1991-1999 and  
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Note:  Risks are relative to men in the same occupational classes from 1967 to November of 1991. Models control for time since first 
birth, age at first birth, whether respondent was surveyed in St. Pet. or Moscow, missing categories, siblings, urban/rural birth, 
and union status. All relative risks are statistically significant at the 0.1% level. 
 
 
based on their human capital and is a more up-to-date indicator of skill development 
than education. On the other hand, if a respondent steps out of the labor force, they do 
not have an occupational class status at that moment in time. Given that women are 
likely to be out of the labor market for some time following the birth of the first child, 
the models are specified in two different ways. First the “immediate” occupational class 
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is interacted with time period, which will give us the estimates of occupational class 
only for those who are in the labor market at the time. The second model considers 
occupational class as a more constant or “smoothed” state, by holding the class status 
constant when the respondent stepped out of the labor force, took leave or was between 
jobs. This strategy reduces the effect that differential participation rates might have on 
the estimates of occupational class.  
As expected very little difference emerged between the smoothed and immediate 
occupational class estimates for men. Men in the intermediate class had the lowest 
transition rate (0.49), relative to men in the same class in the Soviet Union, but as in the 
case of education, the declines were almost identical within groups. Divergence in the 
declines emerges in the economic recovery time period. Men in intermediate 
professions and the professional class had the lowest transition rates (0.39 and 0.38, 
respectively), relative to the rate of men in the same classes before 1991. One distinct 
finding is that, rather than a continuously declining rate, men in the low-mid 
occupational class experienced significantly higher transition rates than men in other 
classes during the economic recovery. However this differential effect was reduced in 
the smoothed model; i.e., if class was held constant in spells of non employment, rather 
than a second birth rate of 0.64 in the immediate model, the low-mid grade workers had 
a rate of 0.58 in the 2000-2004 time period.  
Figure 6 displays results of the models discussed above for women, in which we 
see a somewhat more dramatic difference between the smoothed and immediate 
occupational class models. When class is specified only when women are participating 
in the market, women in the lowest class had the greatest decline in relative risks during 
the economic crisis (0.32 vs. the next lowest risk of 0.37 for the professional class); in 
contrast, women in the highest class had the greatest decline in the period of economic 
recovery (0.27). Holding class constant during periods of non participation, leave, or 
unemployment reveals only a small alteration in the decline across classes in the 
economic crisis period, which reveals greater similarity. Less difference in declines also 
exists in the economic recovery period, however women in the professional class still 
experienced a greater decline in transition rates than women in other classes (0.29). The 
difference between the two models (immediate vs. smoothed class) reveals that women 
in the lowest classes who maintained a foothold in the labor market during the 
economic crisis were perhaps more inclined to postpone or forego second births.  
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Figure 6:  Women: Second birth risks by occupational class, 1991-1999 and 
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Note:  Risks are relative to women in the same occupational classes from 1967 to November of 1991. Models control for time since 
first birth, age at first birth, whether respondent was surveyed in St. Pet. or Moscow, missing categories, siblings, urban/rural 
birth, and union status. All relative risks are statistically significant at the 0.1% level. 
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5. Discussion and conclusions  
This study assessed how second birth transition rates varied over time in Russia 
after the transition from communism began at the end of 1991. Lower second birth rates 
was one of the main drivers of fertility decline in Russia at this time and this analysis 
contributes to our understanding of the fertility decline by assessing changes in rates 
over time among subgroups of men and women rather than comparing rates in one 
period across subgroups of individuals. Moreover the analysis juxtaposed two time 
periods in which the economic context varied dramatically and how transition rates 
varied across these time periods was observed. Until the end of the 1990s, the economic 
context in Russia can be characterized as one of crisis in which there was an exorbitant 
increase in prices, wage growth developed unevenly across skill levels, unemployment 
and wage inequality increased and wages were not always paid in full or on time. 
Human capital accumulation took on an increasingly significant role in financial 
security and well-being during this time period. In 2000, the economic climate reversed 
and GDP growth was accompanied by increased job stability, wage growth across all 
skill levels, less arrears in wages, and lessening inequality. These findings indicate 
varying circumstances for men and women and this study explored whether there were 
differential effects in these diverse economic climates. 
Two main findings emerge from this study. First second birth transition rates were 
even lower in the period of economic recovery than they were in the period of 
economic crisis. However comparing Kaplan-Meier failure curves during the different 
periods reveals that the difference in second birth transitions between the two post 
socialist periods was largely driven by postponement of the second birth. This finding is 
in alignment with research that found a higher likelihood of postponement in more 
favorable economic contexts (Billingsley 2010). Still, the main picture is that of a 
decline in second birth rates after 1990 and that rates did not increase again to their 
pretransition levels. The second broad finding of this study is that the change in second 
birth rates across the three time periods was remarkably similar for all men and women, 
regardless of differential human capital investment and occupational class. While some 
differential effects by human capital levels were expected, this strong finding implies 
that all individuals were impacted similarly. Given the universal impact of high 
inflation and the fact that no occupational class was exempt from experiencing wage 
arrears, this finding is perhaps not surprising. Moreover it corroborates the finding in 
the Ukraine, which is a similar context to Russia, that women of all educational levels 
dramatically suppressed second births and that economic crisis likely accounts for the 
similarity in lower and highly educated women’s altered fertility behavior (Perelli-
Harris 2008).  Demographic Research: Volume 24, Article 16 
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Some differences do emerge in the period of economic recovery, but the relative 
differences in second birth risks that do exist among the different educational groups 
and occupational classes are small and should not be over-interpreted. A few distinct 
patterns emerged that may be worth considering, however. In the period of economic 
recovery, men in the higher educational groups and occupational classes had the 
greatest reduction in second birth transition rates. This pattern is surprising since men 
are not generally required to weigh the value of their time at work against their time at 
home, as women are. However, it may be that once the worst of the economic transition 
was over and the returns to upward mobility grew, men with high aspirations may have 
become more cautious and limited their family size to attain higher status (Bejin 1989; 
Dalla Zuanna 2007). 
The pattern for women is more complex, partly because women are more likely to 
step out of the labor market after having a first child. Regardless of the difference in 
results based on specifications that held occupational class constant or considered only 
the immediate status, women in the professional class experienced the greatest 
reduction in second birth transition rates over the period of economic recovery. This 
finding supports the idea that when the rewards for participation are high, women 
postpone having a second child. This finding was robust to the two specifications of 
occupational class, which indicates that women in the highest occupational class almost 
unanimously participated in the labor market after the first child was born since 
allowing for selectivity into participation (the “immediate” occupational class model) 
hardly altered the estimate. In contrast the estimates during the economic crisis for 
women with the lowest skill level changed more dramatically across the different 
specifications, which indicates that the greater change in rates for manually employed 
women was partly driven by the selection of women at this skill level who remained in 
the labor market during the economic crisis. For women to opt out of the labor market 
when their occupational class was characterized by having lower wage growth and 
higher wage arrears than jobs in other classes is a logical strategy. However the women 
who did not make this choice and stayed in their jobs after the first child was born had 
the greatest reduction in transition rates, relative to their counterparts before the 
transition from communism. This finding may suggest greater need for these mothers to 
contribute to household income, which may be due to unobserved characteristics of the 
partner. 
The majority of the rates discussed are those comparing women and men with 
similar skill levels over time, which are the results that are consistently statistically 
significant, rather than rates across different skill levels. Considering the information 
about declines within groups alongside information about rates across the groups, 
however, offers additional information when considering the fertility decline in Russia. 
Not only did women with the lowest skill level have as great a reduction in second birth Billingsley: Changes in second birth rates within occupational classes and educational groups 
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transition rates over the transition from communism as other women, they had higher 
transition rates to begin with; a change in their rates of transition over time would have 
had a noticeable impact on overall fertility levels in Russia.  
A seemingly contradictory finding in this analysis is that women with the lowest 
educational level had a greater reduction in transition rates in the period of economic 
recovery than women with higher educational levels when the reverse is true when 
observing women’s occupational class. Assuming that respondents’ education matches 
their occupation to a high degree, we would expect women with incomplete secondary 
education to mostly find work in the lowest occupational sector. As the relative decline 
in second birth transition rates was stronger for the lowest educated than for women 
belonging to the lowest occupational class, it appears that when the economy began a 
consistent recovery, some of these women perhaps did not end up in the manual class 
after all. More research on the work trajectories of women after having their first child 
is needed to better understand this deviation in results, particularly in regards to 
job/education mismatch and job instability. Moreover it would be worthwhile to 
explore job growth or stability within the low-mid grade occupational class as men in 
these jobs experienced some recovery of second birth transition rates in the economic 
recovery period. Future research should also discuss and analyze the importance of 
gender roles and further explore how women reconciled paid and unpaid work in the 
Russian context. This research takes only a few steps in the direction of sorting through 
the complicated social and economic processes at work during the fertility decline in 
Russia and leaves many other factors to be explored.  
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Appendix 
A. Occupational  class  description 
Manual laborers (SeC1): unqualified worker or agricultural employee 
Low-mid grade worker (SeC2): Qualified worker or employee performing simpler tasks 
Intermediate employee (SeC3): Team leader, foreman, highly-qualified worker, 
employee with complex tasks and some autonomy 
Salariat (SeC4): Significant leader, professional, autonomous employee, self-employed 
in industry or trade 
 
 
B. Distribution  of  educational attainment within each occupational class,  
1967-2004 
 Education 
Occupational class  low  medium  high 
Manual class (SeC1)  37  58  5 
Low-mid grade class (SeC2)  25  66  8 
Intermediate class (SeC3)  11  65  24 
Salariat or professional class (SeC4)  3  31  66 
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C.  Summary statistics: Exposure and occurrence rates by men and women      
  according to the two time spans analyzed: 1967-2004 and 1991-2004 
 Men  Women 
 person-months failures  person-months  failures 
St. Petersburg/Moscow residence  11693.5  59  34496  113 
        
Rural residence  60541.5  440  126423  881 
Urban residence  91596.5  429  183519  881 
Missing 6690  38  19750.5  62 
        
Only child  28193  115  52232  208 
One sibling  68490.5  301  126840.5  590 
Two siblings   28795.5  206  66020  450 
Three or more siblings  28263  261  76139  551 
Missing 5086  24  8461  25 
        
17-20 at first birth  9971  55  75292  487 
21-24 at first birth  73034.5  443  157518  932 
25-29 at first birth  56355.5  313  62742  333 
30+ at first birth  19467  96  34140.5  72 
        
Single 22461  50  93181  161 
Married or cohabiting  136296  856  236498.5  1663 
Missing 71  1  13  0 
        
In education  1802.5  12  5466.5  18 
Low educational level  31927  222  50188  343 
Medium educational level  90067  484  203412.5  1151 
High educational level  35031.5  189  70617.5  312 
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C.  Summary statistics (Continued) 
 Men  Women 
 person-months failures  person-months failures 
Unemployed 4800  16  5384.5  26 
Manual class (SeC1)  17038  150  25064  190 
Low-mid grade class (SeC2)  67258  388  89486  512 
Intermediate class (SeC3)  33149.5  167  73531.5  409 
Salariat or professional class (SeC4) 24317.5  147  48142  226 
Not participating in the labor force  11342  32  86858.5  455 
Missing 923  7  1226  6 
        
0-1 year since first child born  19240.5  23  38048.5  61 
1-2 years since first child born  17677.5  153  34737  298 
2-3 years since first child born  15258.5  151  30481.5  282 
3-4 years since first child born  13173.5  139  26575  255 
4-5 years since first child born  11312  109  23024.5  214 
5 or more years since first child born 82166  332  176826  714 
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